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In-Depth Analysis· Türkiye Armenia normalization talks Serdar Kılıç Ruben Rubinyan border

Türkiye–Armenia Normalization Since 2022: Special Representatives, Border Opening and Prospects

How Türkiye–Armenia normalization talks between Serdar Kılıç and Ruben Rubinyan began in 2022, what has changed at the border, and what remains unresolved.

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Why It Matters

Will the Türkiye–Armenia border open? Most likely in stages rather than all at once, and the timing depends heavily on whether Armenia and Azerbaijan convert their 2025 initialed peace text into a signed and ratified treaty. The track begun by Special Representatives Serdar Kılıç and Ruben Rubinyan on 14 January 2022 is the first sustained, direct political channel between Ankara and Yerevan since the Zurich Protocols collapsed. It matters because the border, which has been closed since 1993, is one of the last sealed frontiers in Europe's neighbourhood and a key piece of South Caucasus connectivity.

Background

From closed border to the Zurich Protocols

Türkiye recognized Armenia's independence in December 1991 but never established diplomatic relations. In 1993, during the Armenian offensive in and around Kelbajar, Türkiye closed the land border. The UN Security Council had demanded the withdrawal of occupying forces from Azerbaijani territory in Resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 (1993). Ankara has always described the closure as tied to that occupation.

In April 2005, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wrote to Armenian President Robert Kocharyan proposing a Joint Historical Commission of historians. The two sides signed the Zurich Protocols on 10 October 2009, providing for diplomatic relations, border opening and a sub-commission on historical dimensions. Neither parliament ratified them. Armenia suspended the process in 2010 and formally annulled the Protocols in 2018.

The post-Karabakh opening

The Second Karabakh War (27 September–10 November 2020) ended with a trilateral statement signed by Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia. In September 2023, Azerbaijan's operation ended the separatist administration in Karabakh, and most of the Armenian population left the region. These events changed the regional balance and opened space for a Türkiye–Armenia track. In December 2021 each side named a Special Representative.

Timeline of the 2022 track

Date Event
December 2021 Türkiye names Ambassador Serdar Kılıç and Armenia names Deputy Speaker Ruben Rubinyan as Special Representatives
14 January 2022 First meeting, Moscow: sides agree to proceed without preconditions and aim at full normalization
24 February 2022 Second meeting, Vienna
1 July 2022 Third meeting, Vienna: sides announce agreement in principle to open the land border to third-country nationals and diplomatic passport holders, and to start direct air cargo trade
Early 2022 Direct commercial flights between Istanbul and Yerevan resume
6 October 2022 Erdoğan and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan meet on the sidelines of the European Political Community summit in Prague
February 2023 After the Kahramanmaraş earthquakes, the Margara–Alican crossing opens for Armenian aid convoys and rescuers, the first use since 1988; Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan visits Türkiye
20 June 2025 Pashinyan meets Erdoğan in Istanbul
8 August 2025 Aliyev and Pashinyan initial an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement text at the White House

Public information on later implementation steps changes quickly. Readers should check the Turkish and Armenian foreign ministry websites for current status.

Key Players & Positions

Armenia

Armenia's government, led by Prime Minister Pashinyan, supports establishing diplomatic relations and opening the border without preconditions. It presents its 'Crossroads of Peace' initiative as a vision for regional trade and transit routes through Armenia. Yerevan says it respects the territorial integrity of its neighbours on the basis of the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration. At the same time, Armenia, as most Armenians and diaspora organizations do, regards the 1915 massacres and deportations as genocide and does not treat that as a negotiable question. Opposition parties in Armenia, including the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaksutyun), criticize the process.

Azerbaijan

Baku has welcomed Türkiye–Armenia contacts in principle but stresses that its own peace agreement with Armenia is the priority. Azerbaijan's official position, set out by President Ilham Aliyev, is that Armenia must amend the preamble of its Constitution, which refers to the 1990 Declaration of Independence, because Baku reads it as carrying territorial implications. The Washington text of August 2025 was initialed, not signed or ratified. Armenia says a constitutional referendum is possible only on its own timetable.

Russia, the United States and the European Union

  • Russia hosted the first meeting in Moscow and historically guarded part of the Armenia–Türkiye frontier. Its influence in Armenia has declined since 2023.
  • The United States under President Donald Trump hosted the August 2025 Aliyev–Pashinyan meeting and promoted the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a transit corridor through southern Armenia.
  • The European Union hosted Armenia–Azerbaijan talks in Brussels and supports border opening and connectivity. Armenia's rapprochement with the EU is a sensitive subject for Moscow.

What remains unresolved

  • No diplomatic relations have been established, and the land border is not open for ordinary traffic.
  • Armenia and Azerbaijan have no signed and ratified peace treaty.
  • Armenia's constitutional question is open.
  • There is no agreed mechanism on the Events of 1915.
  • Border infrastructure, notably the Kars–Gyumri railway line, needs investment and political decisions.
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Türkiye's Position

  • Normalization without preconditions. According to the joint statements published by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the Special Representatives' meetings, both sides agreed to continue talks aimed at full normalization 'without preconditions'. Ankara argues that this framework replaced the stalled Zurich-era approach.
  • Normalization alongside Armenia–Azerbaijan peace. Turkish officials, including President Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, have said that Türkiye acts in coordination with Azerbaijan and that a durable Armenia–Azerbaijan peace will enable fuller steps. Ankara cites the 1993 UN Security Council resolutions as the origin of the border closure and presents regional peace as its resolution.
  • History belongs to historians. Ankara's formal proposal, set out in Erdoğan's April 2005 letter to Kocharyan, is an independent Joint Historical Commission of Turkish, Armenian and international historians with full access to Ottoman, Armenian and third-country archives. Türkiye rejects parliamentary resolutions by third countries as political impositions. It also notes that 'genocide' is a legal category under the 1948 UN Genocide Convention that requires proven specific intent (dolus specialis) established by a competent tribunal. See our guide to The Events of 1915: Archives, Legal Framework and the Fair Memory Proposal.
  • Treaty-based borders. Türkiye holds that its eastern frontier is settled by the Treaties of Moscow and Kars (1921), reaffirmed by Lausanne (1923) as the international framework. Ankara has consistently sought Armenian confirmation of the existing border, as the 2009 Protocols envisaged.
  • Connectivity and humanitarian steps. The Turkish side points to flights, the earthquake-aid crossing of February 2023 and proposals for rail and trade links as evidence of good faith, and says it is ready for further practical steps as conditions mature.

These points reflect official Turkish positions. Armenia disputes the sequencing and the historical framing, as noted above.

Source Comparison

Question Turkish primary sources Armenian official sources International media and think tanks
Why is the border closed? A 1993 response to the occupation of Azerbaijani territory, covered by UNSC Resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 A Turkish measure that has no legal basis and should be lifted unconditionally Often described as solidarity with Azerbaijan, with limited reference to the UN resolutions
Preconditions Joint statements say 'without preconditions'; the pace is linked to Armenia–Azerbaijan peace Border opening should not depend on a third state Mixed: some see de facto linkage, others note both sides' statements
1915 Proposes a Joint Historical Commission; rejects unilateral political verdicts Genocide is a historical fact; recognition is not a precondition for talks Many governments and scholars use the term genocide; the legal-versus-historical distinction is less discussed
Peace with Azerbaijan Prerequisite for durable regional peace Supports peace but wants no external linkage Presents Washington 2025 as a breakthrough with treaty hurdles
Outcome so far Incremental, practical steps Border opening is delayed Described as progress with a slow pace

For our standards on citing both sides' primary documents, see Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards. For other common claims, see Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media, Corrected with Primary Sources.

  • Special Representatives: Envoys named to run the bilateral track outside the routine ministerial channel. Türkiye's is Ambassador Serdar Kılıç; Armenia's is Ruben Rubinyan, Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly.
  • Zurich Protocols (2009): Two signed but never ratified protocols on diplomatic relations and border opening.
  • Margara–Alican crossing: The road crossing on the Armenia–Türkiye frontier, used in February 2023 for earthquake aid.
  • Treaty of Kars (1921): The treaty among Türkiye, the Soviet republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and Soviet Russia that fixed the eastern border.
  • Joint Historical Commission: Ankara's 2005 proposal for a joint study of the Events of 1915.
  • TRIPP: The US-promoted transit route proposal through southern Armenia.

Related reading: the Bordersandblocs home page, About Bordersandblocs: Mission, Transparency and Editorial Team, and Frequently Asked Questions About Bordersandblocs, Sources and Methodology.

Bordersandblocs presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

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Frequently asked questions

Will the Türkiye–Armenia border open?

Probably in phases. The sides have agreed in principle to open the land border to third-country nationals and diplomatic passport holders, and the crossing was used for aid in 2023. Full opening to ordinary traffic has no fixed date and is widely expected to depend on progress toward a signed Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty.

Who are Serdar Kılıç and Ruben Rubinyan?

Serdar Kılıç is a Turkish diplomat who serves as Türkiye's Special Representative for the normalization process. Ruben Rubinyan is Deputy Speaker of Armenia's National Assembly and Armenia's Special Representative. They held their first meeting in Moscow on 14 January 2022.

Why was the border closed in the first place?

Türkiye closed it in 1993 during the Armenian offensive around Kelbajar in Azerbaijan. The UN Security Council demanded the withdrawal of occupying forces in Resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884. Armenia rejects the linkage and says the border should be open regardless.

Is the Events of 1915 dispute part of the normalization talks?

Not as a formal precondition. Türkiye's 2005 proposal for a Joint Historical Commission remains its position, and Armenia treats genocide recognition as a settled historical question. Both governments have kept the issue off the Special Representatives' working agenda.

What role does Azerbaijan play in the process?

Türkiye coordinates closely with Azerbaijan, and Ankara links the full normalization pace to Armenia–Azerbaijan peace. Baku's key demand is a change to the preamble of Armenia's Constitution, and the August 2025 Washington text has been initialed but not yet signed or ratified.

What trade and travel links already exist?

Direct commercial flights between Istanbul and Yerevan resumed in 2022, and the sides announced agreement on direct air cargo trade. The Margara–Alican crossing opened for humanitarian aid after the February 2023 earthquakes. Rail and regular land trade remain to be implemented.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

Bordersandblocs presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

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