In-Depth Analysis· UN Security Council reform the world is bigger than five Türkiye

'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Türkiye's Case for UN Security Council Reform

Why does Türkiye want UN Security Council reform? The veto, G4, Uniting for Consensus and African models, and Ankara's 'world is bigger than five' case.

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By Borders & Blocs Editorial Team

Published: October 26, 2026

⏱ 10 min read (2,093 words)

Executive Summary & Key Facts

The UN Security Council has 15 members, of which only five (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) are permanent and hold a veto; the other ten are elected for two-year terms.
The Council has been enlarged only once, in 1963 (in force 1965), when it grew from 11 to 15 members, while UN membership has since risen from 113 to 193 states.
Any Charter amendment needs a two-thirds General Assembly vote and ratification by two-thirds of members including all five permanent members (Article 108), so the P5 can in effect veto reform of the veto.
Türkiye's thesis 'The world is bigger than five' (Dünya beşten büyüktür) argues that no fixed group of five states can legitimately speak for humanity, and Ankara backs a more representative, accountable and rotation-minded Council rather than new permanent seats.
Türkiye belongs to the Uniting for Consensus group, which opposes new permanent seats; it competes with the G4 and African Common Position models, and this clash of reform models is a main reason negotiations have stalled since 2008.

Why It Matters

Türkiye wants UN Security Council reform because it argues that a body whose permanent membership was fixed in 1945 cannot credibly decide on war and peace for 193 member states. Its slogan, 'The world is bigger than five' (Dünya beşten büyüktür), was voiced repeatedly by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at successive UN General Assembly debates. It is a call for a more representative, transparent and accountable Council, with tighter limits on the veto. What would change under Ankara's approach is who sits at the table, for how long, and who answers for blocked decisions.

Background

How the Council is built

The Security Council is the UN organ with 'primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security' (UN Charter, Article 24). Its decisions on sanctions, peacekeeping and the use of force are binding on all members (Article 25).

Membership (Article 23): 15 members. Five are permanent: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Ten are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, five each year, by a two-thirds majority.
Regional allocation of elected seats: three for Africa, two for Asia-Pacific, two for Latin America and the Caribbean, two for the Western European and Others Group, and one for Eastern Europe.
Voting (Article 27): substantive decisions need nine affirmative votes and no negative vote from a permanent member. This is the veto. An abstention is not a veto.
Amendment (Articles 108 and 109): changes to the Charter need a two-thirds General Assembly vote and ratification by two-thirds of members, including all five permanent members.

The five permanent seats are about 2.6% of the 193 UN members. They hold a power that no other state has.

The veto in practice

The veto has been used hundreds of times since 1946. Recent examples include Russia's veto of a February 2022 draft resolution on Ukraine and repeated Russian vetoes on Syria. The United States has vetoed several draft resolutions on Gaza since October 2023. Critics from across the political spectrum say such vetoes can paralyse the Council in the crises where it is most needed. Defenders, including the permanent members themselves, say the veto keeps great powers inside the system and prevents the UN from adopting decisions that the strongest states would refuse to implement.

Timeline of reform efforts

Date	Event
1945	UN Charter signed; five permanent seats and the veto are written into Articles 23 and 27
1963 (in force 1965)	General Assembly Resolution 1991 (XVIII) enlarges the Council from 11 to 15 members; the only expansion to date
1979	'Equitable representation and increase in the membership' becomes a standing General Assembly agenda item
1993	Open-Ended Working Group on Council reform established
2005	G4 draft resolution and the African Union's Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration set out rival models; neither is adopted
2008	Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) launched under General Assembly decision 62/557
26 April 2022	General Assembly Resolution 76/262 requires a General Assembly debate after any veto
22 September 2024	The Pact for the Future (Resolution 79/1) renews the commitment to reform and acknowledges Africa's under-representation

Key Players & Positions

The reform debate is organised around five clusters set by the IGN: categories of membership, the veto, regional representation, the size of an enlarged Council and its working methods, and the Council–General Assembly relationship. Positions below are summarised from the groups' own public statements; details vary between statements.

Actor or group	Core position
G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan)	New permanent seats for themselves and for African representation, plus additional non-permanent seats. They have indicated flexibility on veto use for new permanent members.
Uniting for Consensus (UfC), including Italy, Pakistan, Mexico, Egypt, Spain, Argentina, Canada, South Korea and Türkiye	No new permanent seats. A larger Council (roughly 25–26 members) with new elected seats, possibly with longer terms and re-election, and no extension of the veto.
African Union (Ezulwini Consensus 2005, Sirte Declaration)	Two permanent seats with full prerogatives, including the veto, and five additional non-permanent seats for Africa.
ACT Group, France and Mexico	Not a seat model. A voluntary Code of Conduct and a political pledge to refrain from using the veto in mass-atrocity situations.
Small island developing states, CARICOM	A dedicated or more regular presence for small states in an enlarged Council.

The permanent members

The five do not speak with one voice. France and the United Kingdom have publicly supported expanding both categories and backing G4 members and African representation. The United States has said it supports expansion, and in September 2024 its UN ambassador outlined support for two permanent African seats without veto and a rotating seat for small island states. Russia has expressed support for greater Asian, African and Latin American representation and for the aspirations of India and Brazil, but rejects what it calls Western-dominated enlargement. China backs greater developing-country representation, especially for Africa, and is cautious about the new permanent seats sought by some G4 members.

Why reform is stalled

Three structural obstacles explain more than 15 years of IGN talks without a negotiating text accepted by all.

The amendment lock. Under Article 108, the P5 can block any change, including limits on their own veto.
Rival aspirants. Each proposed permanent seat has regional rivals: Italy and Spain with Germany, Pakistan with India, Argentina and Mexico with Brazil, South Korea with Japan, and several African states with one another. This is why UfC rejects new permanent seats.
The veto question. Africa wants the veto extended, the G4 accept restraint, and many states want it curtailed. These positions cannot be reconciled without P5 consent.

The IGN also works by consensus, and the question is rolled over each General Assembly session, so no single group can force a vote.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources · Treaty Texts

Türkiye's Position

The points below reflect official Turkish policy as stated by the Presidency, the Directorate of Communications, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Türkiye's UN statements. Ankara has not published a single detailed amendment text, so the elements are drawn from repeated public statements and should be checked against the full originals (see our Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards).

Legitimacy of representation. Erdoğan has repeated 'The world is bigger than five' in General Assembly general debates since the mid-2010s, and developed the argument in his 2021 book A Fairer World Is Possible. Ankara argues that a Council reflecting the 1945 balance of power cannot claim to act 'on behalf of' all members, as Article 24(1) of the Charter provides, nor respect the sovereign equality of members under Article 2(1).
No new privileged tier. As a member of Uniting for Consensus, Türkiye opposes creating new permanent seats. According to UfC and Turkish statements, this would entrench a larger group of states with lasting privileges while leaving most regions and the majority of members permanently outside.
Rotation and wider access. Turkish officials favour a model in which Council seats are shared among states and regions over time rather than held indefinitely, along with an expanded elected category. Türkiye itself served as an elected member in 2009–2010, among earlier terms, and lost its bid for the 2015–2016 term to Spain and New Zealand in 2014.
Accountability for the veto. Erdoğan and the Turkish Foreign Ministry have criticised vetoes that block action on humanitarian crises, citing Gaza, Syria and Ukraine. Ankara supports curbing the veto, especially in atrocity situations, and backs greater transparency in Council working methods and a stronger General Assembly role, consistent with Resolution 76/262.
Reform as a means, not a rhetorical end. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Türkiye ties reform to the Council's effectiveness. Ankara's own mediation record, covered in Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War and the Black Sea Grain Initiative and Gaza and Palestine: Türkiye's Humanitarian Diplomacy and Diplomatic Position, is presented as evidence that the Council is often bypassed or blocked.

Legal and historical basis. Ankara relies on the UN Charter itself: Article 2(1) on sovereign equality, Article 24 on the Council acting on members' behalf, Article 23 on equitable geographical distribution of elected seats, and Article 109, which provides for a Charter review conference. It also points to the 1963 enlargement as precedent that the Council's composition has been revised before.

What would change under Ankara's approach

Composition: more elected seats and no additional permanent ones, with longer or renewable terms as a possible compromise within the UfC framework.
Veto: restraint in mass-atrocity cases, with stronger General Assembly follow-up after each use.
Working methods: more open consultations, better access for non-members and troop contributors, and fuller accountability to the wider membership.

These changes would still need P5 ratification under Article 108, which Ankara acknowledges is the central political difficulty.

Source Comparison

The sources broadly agree on the facts of the Council's structure and the deadlock. They differ on the cause and on whether Türkiye's stance is principled or tactical.

Question	Typical Western or international analysis	Turkish primary sources
Why is reform stuck?	P5 reluctance and rivalries between aspirants; Article 108 lock	The same lock, but also the unwillingness to share power; a closed-door negotiating culture
Is Türkiye's stance credible?	Some commentators see it as rhetoric aligned with Ankara's wider foreign policy ambitions, or point out that Türkiye also lacks a seat	Presented as a long-standing principle on sovereign equality, consistent with UfC and with positions held across Turkish governments
Permanent seats	G4 and the African Union treat new permanent seats as the route to legitimacy	Opposes new permanent seats; prefers broader elected, rotating access
The veto	Focus on atrocity-restraint pledges (ACT Code of Conduct, France–Mexico initiative)	Supports these ideas but says the underlying problem is concentrated power, citing blocked action on Gaza and Syria
Role of the General Assembly	Resolution 76/262 seen as a modest transparency gain	Seen as a useful precedent that should be strengthened

Readers can compare these framings against UN primary texts: the Charter, Resolutions 1991 (XVIII), 62/557 (decision), 76/262 and 79/1, and the verbatim records of the General Assembly general debates.

P5: the five permanent members of the Security Council.
Veto: the power of a permanent member to block a substantive Council decision by voting 'no' (Article 27).
G4: Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, who support one another's permanent membership.
Uniting for Consensus (UfC): a coalition of mid-sized states, including Türkiye, opposing new permanent seats and favouring more elected ones.
Ezulwini Consensus: the African Union's 2005 common position demanding two permanent and five non-permanent seats for Africa.
IGN: the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Council reform, run under General Assembly auspices since 2008.
Article 108: the Charter amendment rule that gives each permanent member a veto over reform itself.

Related guides: the veto and Straits diplomacy in The 1936 Montreux Convention and Black Sea Security, Türkiye's other multilateral agenda in COP31, Zero Waste and Türkiye's Climate Diplomacy, how sources are used in Frequently Asked Questions About Bordersandblocs, Sources and Methodology, and the publisher's mission in About Bordersandblocs.

Bordersandblocs presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

Bordersandblocs Editorial Team

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

Bloc Politics: 'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Türkiye's Case for UN Security Council Reform — How the UN Security Council works, the P5 veto, G4, Uniting for Consensus and African Group plans, and Türkiye's 'The world is bigger than five' reform case.
The State Papers: 'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Türkiye's Case for UN Security Council Reform — Why Türkiye says 'the world is bigger than five': how the Security Council veto works, what G4, Uniting for Consensus and Africa propose, and Ankara's view.
World Agenda Review: 'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Türkiye's Case for UN Security Council Reform — How the UN Security Council's veto works, which reform models compete, and why Türkiye argues 'the world is bigger than five' on Security Council reform.

Frequently asked questions

Why does Türkiye want UN Security Council reform?

Ankara argues that a Council whose five permanent members were fixed in 1945 does not represent today's 193 members and often cannot act because of vetoes. Its slogan, 'The world is bigger than five', calls for broader representation, rotation-minded access and accountability. Turkish officials cite blocked action on Gaza, Syria and Ukraine as examples.

What does 'The world is bigger than five' mean?

It is a phrase used repeatedly by President Erdoğan at the UN General Assembly and means that five states cannot decide global security for all. It does not by itself prescribe a seat formula. In practice it supports Uniting for Consensus, curbs on the veto, and wider participation in Council decisions.

Does Türkiye want a permanent seat?

Türkiye is a member of Uniting for Consensus, which opposes creating new permanent seats. Turkish statements instead favour broader access through elected and rotating membership, plus limits on the veto. Türkiye has served as an elected member, including in 2009–2010.

Why has UN Security Council reform not happened?

Article 108 of the Charter lets each permanent member block any amendment, and rival aspirants and regional blocs disagree on who should gain seats. The G4, UfC and the African Union also differ on whether to create new permanent seats and extend the veto. Negotiations since 2008 are consensus-based and have produced no agreed text.

What is the difference between the G4, Uniting for Consensus and the African Common Position?

The G4 seek new permanent seats for Brazil, Germany, India and Japan plus African representation. Uniting for Consensus opposes new permanent seats and proposes more elected seats, possibly with longer terms. The African Common Position demands two permanent seats with veto rights and five more non-permanent seats for Africa.

Can the veto be limited without amending the Charter?

Partially. General Assembly Resolution 76/262 (2022) requires a debate after any veto without changing Article 27. The ACT Code of Conduct and the France–Mexico initiative are voluntary pledges to refrain from the veto in mass-atrocity cases. Binding limits would require a Charter amendment with P5 ratification.

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