Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War and the Black Sea Grain Initiative

Why It Matters

Türkiye is the only NATO member that hosted both high-level Russia–Ukraine diplomacy and the one agreement of the war that both sides signed and implemented at scale: the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Its achievements as a mediator were concrete but humanitarian in nature (a grain corridor, prisoner and body exchanges, a venue for talks), while its limits are equally clear: it has no means of forcing either side toward a ceasefire or a political settlement.

Background

The mediation record is easiest to follow chronologically. The table below lists the main milestones.

The July 2022 Istanbul agreements

The 2022-07-22 package consisted of two parts. The first was the Black Sea Grain Initiative itself, concluded between the UN, Türkiye, Russia and Ukraine. In practice it took the form of parallel arrangements: Türkiye with Russia and the UN, and Türkiye with Ukraine and the UN. The second was a separate memorandum of understanding between Russia and the UN Secretariat on facilitating Russian food and fertilizer exports.

Under the initiative, cargo ships left three Ukrainian ports (Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi) along an agreed corridor. Vessels were inspected in Turkish waters by joint teams of UN, Turkish, Russian and Ukrainian officials, with the JCC in Istanbul coordinating schedules and safe passage. According to UN figures, approximately 33 million tonnes of grain and other foodstuffs were shipped before the arrangement ended.

Why it ended

Russia declined to extend the initiative on 2023-07-17. Moscow said that the parts of the package concerning its own exports had not been delivered, citing obstacles to banking (including the reconnection of the agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank to the SWIFT messaging system), shipping and insurance, and the status of an ammonia pipeline. The UN said it had pursued these issues with all relevant parties, and the EU said its sanctions do not target Russian food and fertilizer trade. Russia also argued that too little grain reached the poorest countries. After the lapse, Russian strikes on Ukrainian Danube and Black Sea port infrastructure intensified, and Ukraine established its own temporary shipping corridor in August 2023.

Prisoner exchanges and later talks

Türkiye has also facilitated humanitarian contacts beyond grain. In September 2022 it was part of an arrangement in which Ukrainian commanders from the Azov regiment were transferred to Türkiye under agreed conditions. They returned to Ukraine in July 2023, which Moscow criticized as inconsistent with that understanding. The 2025 Istanbul rounds, the first direct talks between the two delegations since 2022, produced large exchanges of prisoners and bodies, but the sides' positions on territory, security guarantees and sanctions remained far apart.

Key Players & Positions

• Ukraine. Kyiv backed the grain corridor as vital to its economy and to global food supply, and says it would continue exports without Russian consent if necessary, as it did after July 2023. President Zelensky's government rejects territorial concessions and promotes its own peace formula, treating Türkiye's venue and facilitation as useful but not a substitute for Russian withdrawal.
• Russia. Moscow says it acted in good faith in 2022 and that the initiative continued only as long as its own export commitments under the Russia–UN memorandum were met. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has repeatedly said Russia could return if those commitments were fulfilled. Russia describes the March 2022 Istanbul framework as the basis for a possible settlement, a reading Kyiv and its partners reject.
• United Nations. The UN Secretary-General, UN relief officials and UNCTAD supported both parts of the Istanbul package, treating the Russia–UN memorandum as inseparable in principle from the shipping arrangement. After the lapse, the UN urged Russia to return and said it would keep working on global food-security measures.
• European Union. The EU welcomed the 2022 agreements, condemned Russia's decision to end the initiative, and argued that its sanctions contain exemptions for agricultural and fertilizer trade. In parallel, it developed overland 'Solidarity Lanes' to move Ukrainian grain, which took on more importance once the sea corridor closed.

What Türkiye Achieved and Where Its Role Stops

Achievements.

• It convened the first top-level Russia–Ukraine meeting (Antalya) and the first direct delegation talks (Istanbul) of the 2022 war.
• It brokered, with the UN, the single large-scale agreement implemented between the two warring parties, which delivered roughly 33 million tonnes of food cargoes.
• It hosted the JCC, giving all four parties an operational body in which they worked together on inspections and passage.
• It supported prisoner and body exchanges and hosted the 2025 rounds, the most direct contacts since 2022.

Limits.

• No enforcement power. The 2022 package depended on Russian consent. When Moscow judged its side unfulfilled, Türkiye could not keep the initiative alive.
• Humanitarian, not political. Grain and prisoner swaps were possible because they did not require either party to concede on territory, security guarantees or sanctions. Those core issues remain unresolved.
• Dependent on a third party's concessions. The Russian side of the deal required action on banking, insurance and sanctions-related issues that Türkiye does not control; these sat with the EU, the US and the UN.
• Balance has costs. Non-participation in sanctions draws criticism from some Western governments, while Moscow objects to Turkish defence cooperation with Ukraine. Both argue about whether Ankara is truly neutral.

Source Comparison

Readers should compare official statements with UN data and independent trade statistics, as outlined in our Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards. Where Turkish media or officials frame the story, we attribute it to them explicitly; for other common claims, see our Fact Check hub.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI): the 2022-07-22 arrangement among the UN, Türkiye, Russia and Ukraine for shipping Ukrainian grain from three ports.
• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): the Istanbul-based body staffed by the four parties that scheduled and inspected ships.
• Russia–UN memorandum: a separate text on Russian food and fertilizer exports; Moscow's main grievance.
• Montreux Convention (1936): the treaty governing passage through the Turkish Straits; see the Montreux guide.
• Istanbul communiqué (2022): the March 2022 Ukrainian proposal on neutrality and guarantees, never agreed.

Related: Bordersandblocs home, Counter-Terrorism at the Source for Türkiye's defence-industry context, and The World Is Bigger Than Five.

Bordersandblocs presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

• Bloc Politics: Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War: Istanbul Talks and the Black Sea Grain Initiative — How the Black Sea Grain Initiative worked: Türkiye's mediation, the Joint Coordination Centre, 33 million tons shipped and why the deal lapsed.
• Crossroads Review: Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War and the Black Sea Grain Initiative — Türkiye mediation Russia Ukraine Black Sea Grain Initiative explained: Antalya and Istanbul talks, the UN-brokered grain deal and why it ended.
• The Political Accord: Russia–Ukraine Mediation and the Black Sea Grain Initiative: Türkiye's Diplomatic Record — How Türkiye hosted Russia–Ukraine talks, brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative with the UN, and why it lapsed in 2023: a chronology of Istanbul diplomacy.